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Conﬂict, convergence, cooperation and competition among governance actors
and institutions have long fascinated scholars of transnational law, yet
transnational legal theorists’ accounts of such interactions are for the most
part tentative, incomplete and unsystematic. Having elsewhere proposed an
overarching conceptual framework for the study of transnational business
governance interactions (TBGI), in this article we propose criteria for
middle-range theory-building. We argue that a portfolio of theoretical
perspectives on transnational governance interactions should account for the
multiplicity of interacting entities and scales of interaction; the co-evolution
of social agency and structure; the multiple components of regulatory
governance; the role of interactions as both inﬂuence and outcome; the
diverse modes of interaction; the mechanisms and pathways of interaction;
and the spatio-temporal dynamics of interaction. To suggest the value of
these criteria, we apply them in a preliminary way to selected transnational
legal scholarship and to the other articles in this special issue.
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Theorising interactive dynamics: An introduction

Conﬂict, convergence, cooperation and competition among legal systems, institutions, actors and rules have long fascinated scholars of transnational law.
Indeed, understanding the dispersion of rule-making authority and managing the
resulting overlaps and interactions are central problems of transnational law.1
These problems have increased as transnational rule systems have proliferated
and international law has fragmented. In this article we focus on an important
subset of the phenomenon: interactions among actors and institutions engaged
in the transnational governance of business conduct, or “transnational business
governance interactions” (TBGI). We propose criteria for theorising these interactive dynamics and assess the articles in this special issue and other relevant transnational legal literature against them.
Scholars of transnational law frequently recognise the importance of governance interactions and address them from diverse perspectives. Yet with notable
exceptions, their accounts are tentative, incomplete and unsystematic. Philip
Jessup’s 1956 Storrs Lectures are illustrative. They show that interaction among
legal orders has been a preoccupation of transnational law since its beginnings.2
Jessup was concerned with the dispersion of “authority to make the rules men
live by”, the transnational proliferation of law-making institutions and the interplay among rule systems.3 He saw the core problem for transnational law as determining which actors have effective authority to deal with which transnational
situations and which rules prevail in cases of conﬂict. Jessup thus focused on
rule conﬂict, primarily in the context of adjudication; his primary prescription
was to authorise adjudicators “to choose from all of these bodies of law the rule
considered to be most in conformity with reason and justice for the solution of
any particular controversy”.4
Yet Jessup painted an incomplete picture. First, conﬂict is only one mode of
interaction. Even within conﬂict of laws, cooperation abounds, through treaties,
model laws, supranational legislation and mutual adjustment of national laws.5
Secondly, adjudication is only one component of regulatory governance; interaction also occurs at other stages. Most importantly, Jessup was frustratingly
vague about the dynamics of interaction among normative orders. And although
he recognised that non-state actors and institutions may promulgate legal rules,
he barely explored their interactions with other legal orders.6

1

Eg Philip Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956) 4–8.
Ibid.
3
Jessup (n 1) 8.
4
Jessup (n 1) 106.
5
Eg Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (Edward Elgar, 2nd edn, 2010).
6
The exception is a brief mention of maritime law as a mix of national laws, treaties and
non-state rules. Jessup (n 1) 109–110.
2
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We argue for a more systematic, comprehensive analysis of the interactive
dimension of transnational law. Our ﬁrst step in this direction was to articulate a general analytical framework,7 summarised at the start of Part
3. Grounded in a regulatory governance perspective, the TBGI framework
enables scholars to explore interactions among transnational, state and interstate rule systems; examine the effects of interactions on governance capacity,
outputs, outcomes and impacts; and investigate how interactions can be
steered to foster desired effects. It provides a common frame within which
to identify knowledge gaps, plan research, compare results and generate
descriptive typologies.
Yet an analytical framework can take us only so far. In the remainder of Part
3, we consider theory development. Given the complexity of transnational governance interactions, no single theoretical approach can be satisfactory. Thus, we
aim to foster theoretical experimentation while encouraging the application of
perspectives that are well suited to produce valuable insights in this complex
ﬁeld. For that purpose, we propose seven broad criteria for theory building: a
portfolio or toolkit of theoretical perspectives on TBGI should account for the
multiplicity of interacting entities and scales of interaction; the co-evolution of
social agency and structure; the multiple components of regulatory governance;
the role of interactions as both inﬂuence and outcome; the diverse modes of
interaction; the mechanisms and pathways of interaction; and the spatio-temporal dynamics of interaction. To suggest the value of these criteria, we apply
them in a preliminary way to the articles in this special issue and other relevant
works.8

2. Transnational business governance interactions
Efforts to govern transnational activities have long existed in many domains of economic and social life, including weights and measures,9 products,10 accounting,11

Burkard Eberlein and others, “Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis” (2014) 8 Regulation and Governance 1.
8
See also Stepan Wood, “Transnational Governance Interactions: A Critical Review of the
Legal Literature”, Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No 35/2015, TBGI Project Subseries No 21, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2644465, accessed 28 October 2015. We engage
with scholarship in international relations, political science and global governance in Eberlein, ibid.
9
Robert Tavernor, Smoot’s Ear: The Measure of Humanity (Yale University Press, 2007).
10
John Perry, The Story of Standards (Funk & Wagnalls, 1955); Alan O Sykes, Product
Standards for Internationally Integrated Goods Markets (Brookings Institute, 1995).
11
Kees Camfferman and Stephen A Zeff, Financial Reporting and Global Capital Markets:
A History of the International Accounting Standards Committee 1973–2000 (Oxford University Press, 2006).
7
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electricity,12 and religious observance.13 With globalisation, these efforts have proliferated. Today virtually every issue area, industry or profession that transcends
national borders is the object of at least one transnational governance program.
These range from straightforward technical coordination standards to the regulation
of contentious production and consumption externalities.14
With this multiplicity come increasingly complex interactions. In some domains,
one governance scheme achieves dominance.15 In others, schemes address different
issues (eg measuring greenhouse gas emissions vs the effectiveness of mitigation projects)16 or regulatory tasks (eg rule-making, enforcement and adjudication). In still
others, schemes compete for “regulatory share”.17 They may compete on certain
matters (eg rule stringency, transparency or veriﬁcation) while cooperating or converging on others (eg general principles or design features). Competition and cooperation
may lead to harmonisation18 or to forum-shopping and persistent divergence.19 Interactions may foster experimentation, efﬁciency, innovation and learning, or engender
duplication, inconsistency, confusion and ennui. In short, such interactive dynamics
have important but little-understood implications for the legitimacy and effectiveness
of transnational law and governance. They merit systematic study.

Tim Büthe, “Engineering Uncontestedness? The Origins and Institutional Development
of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)” (2010) 12 (3) Business & Politics
Article 4 <http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bap.2010.12.3/bap.2010.12.3.1338/bap.2010.
12.3.1338.xml?format=INT> accessed 19 November 2015.
13
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamic Texts Society,
3rd edn, 2003); Timothy D Lytton, Kosher: Private Regulation in the Age of Industrial
Food (Harvard, 2013).
14
Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “International ‘Standards’ and International Governance” (2001) 8 Journal of European Public Policy 345; Errol Meidinger, “Beyond Westphalia: Competitive Legalization in Emerging Transnational Regulatory Systems”, in
Christian Brütsch and Dirk Lehmkuhl (eds), Law and Legalization in Transnational
Relations (Routledge, 2007) 121.
15
Büthe (n 12) (electricity); John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation
(Cambridge University Press, 2000) 222–255 (labour).
16
Eg Kenneth W Abbott, Jessica F Green and Robert O Keohane, “Organizational Ecology
and Institutional Change in Global Governance” (2016) International Organization,
forthcoming.
17
Julia Black, “Legitimacy and the Competition for Regulatory Share” (2009) LSE Law,
Society and Economy Working Paper 14/2009 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1424654>
accessed 28 October 2015.
18
Eg Christine Overdevest, “Comparing Forest Certiﬁcation Schemes: The Case of Ratcheting Standards in the Forest Sector” (2010) 8 Socio-Economic Review 47; Timothy M
Smith and Miriam Fischlein, “Rival Private Governance Networks: Competing to Deﬁne
the Rules of Sustainability Performance” (2010) 20 Global Environmental Change 511.
19
Eg Lars H Gulbrandsen, Transnational Environmental Governance: The Emergence and
Effects of the Certiﬁcation of Forests and Fisheries (Edward Elgar, 2010); Luc Fransen,
“Multi-stakeholder Governance and Voluntary Programme Interactions: Legitimation
Politics in the Institutional Design of Corporate Social Responsibility” (2012) 10 SocioEconomic Review 163.
12
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We begin by clarifying the concept of transnational business governance
interactions. In transnational governance arrangements, non-state actors exercise signiﬁcant authority in the performance of regulatory roles across national
borders.20 Like Gregory Shaffer and others, we focus on the transnational
character of the actors and institutions that produce and apply law,21 not the
activities or events that law addresses.22 The boundaries of the “transnational”
are necessarily fuzzy, and the literature abounds with deﬁnitions.23 We emphasise the role of non-state actors and institutions in creating and exercising
regulatory authority—a role that remains under-studied in comparison with
that of state and interstate organisations. We accept the continuing importance
of state and interstate actors, but focus on governance arrangements in which
non-state actors play decisive roles, alone or with states or international
organisations.
We focus on the governance of business, which generates some of the most
important challenges to (and developments in) global governance.24 Business
includes all trade and commerce, whether conducted by private or state actors.
Crucially, business is a source, not merely a target, of regulatory governance.
While targets always “co-produce” regulation as they implement it,25 we focus
on arrangements in which business (often together with civil society groups and
other non-state actors) exercises authority to perform regulatory roles, from
agenda-setting and norm development to monitoring and enforcement. Interactions may be equally relevant in domains where business is less central, such
as terrorism, war, human rights, disease or education, but we leave these extensions for further research.
Within the expansive concept of governance, we focus particularly on the
regulatory variety.26 We understand regulation as:

20

Eberlein (n 7).
Gregory Shaffer, “Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change”, in Gregory Shaffer
(ed), Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change (Cambridge University Press,
2013) 1, 5.
22
Eg Henry J Steiner and Detlev F Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems (Foundation Press,
1968).
23
Eg Jessup (n 1); Harold Hongju Koh, “Transnational Legal Process” (1996) 75 Nebraska
Law Review 181; Thomas Hale and David Held, “Editors’ Introduction: Mapping Changes
in Transnational Governance ”, in Thomas Hale and David Held (eds), Handbook of Transnational Governance: Institutions and Innovations (Polity, 2011) 1; Peer Zumbansen,
“Transnational Legal Pluralism” (2010) 1 (2) Transnational Legal Theory 141.
24
Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 3.
25
Julia Black, “Regulatory Conversations” (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 163.
26
Eg Errol Meidinger, “Multi-Interest Self-Governance through Global Product Certiﬁcation Programmes”, in Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg and Gerd Winter (eds), Responsible
Business: Self-Governance and Law in Transnational Economic Transactions (Hart,
2008) 259; David Levi-Faur, “Regulation and Regulatory Governance”, in David LeviFaur (ed), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar, 2011) 1.
21
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the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to identiﬁed purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identiﬁed outcome or outcomes which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering
and behaviour-modiﬁcation.27

So conceived, regulatory governance encompasses a wide variety of instruments,
control mechanisms and actors beyond authoritative legal rules promulgated and
enforced by the state.28 It presupposes no particular institutional arrangements,
organisational forms or techniques. It incorporates not only goal-driven attempts
at ordering, but also their failures and unintended consequences.29 Regulatory
governance is narrower than social control, as it operates through standards,
rules, goals, targets or guidelines.30 While it encompasses various gradations of
coercion,31 it also includes the exercise of epistemic, persuasive and inﬂuential
authority.32 Such authority is important in transnational governance, where regulators “have to promote a motivational response from those whose behaviour it is
they seek to change, but often without the infrastructure of the state to fall back
on”.33
We do not address the jurisprudential question whether particular forms of normative ordering constitute law. Much of the transnational law literature remains
preoccupied with this question.34 As David Szablowski reminds us, law is a
powerful label, reﬂecting collective aspirations for accountability, legitimacy,
and right.35 As a result, it is a powerful tool for legitimation and critique, and
we are interested in how actors deploy the “law/not law” distinction to buttress
or contest claims of authority.

Black, “Regulatory Conversations” (n 25) 170.
Colin Scott, “Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State ”,
in Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and
Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Edward Elgar, 2004) 161–166.
29
Eg Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as
Governance (Pluto, 1994).
30
Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein and Robert Baldwin, The Government of Risk:
Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes (Oxford University Press, 2001) 25.
31
Eg Michael E Conroy, Branded! How the “Certiﬁcation Revolution” is Transforming
Global Corporations (New Society, 2007).
32
Eg Patrick Glenn, “Persuasive Authority” (1987) 32 McGill Law Journal 261; Mayo
Moran, “Inﬂuential Authority and the Estoppel-Like Effect of International Law”, in
Hilary Charlesworth and others (eds), The Fluid State: International Law and National
Legal Systems (Federation Press, 2005) 156.
33
Julia Black, “Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric
Regulatory Regimes” (2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 137, 138–139.
34
Eg Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A
Theory of Transnational Private Law (Hart, 2010); Nicole Roughan, Authorities: Conﬂicts,
Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 2013).
35
David Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles: Mining, Communities and the
World Bank (Hart, 2007), 288; see also Stephen Clarkson and Stepan Wood, A Perilous
Imbalance: The Globalization of Canadian Law and Governance (UBC Press, 2010) 26–27.
27
28
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Interactions are mutual actions and responses of individuals, groups, institutions, structures or systems. They can be intentional or accidental, symmetrical
or asymmetrical. Interactions in transnational business governance take many
forms (eg competition, cooperation, meta-regulation), exploit different causal
pathways (eg modeling, reciprocal adjustment, conditional rule referencing),
produce different patterns (eg regulatory ensembles, orchestrations and ecosystems), and have diverse effects (eg strengthening or weakening of democratic
accountability; divergence or convergence of norms; ratcheting up or down of
standards). Interactions can by analysed at a micro-level (among individual
actors or norms), a meso-level (among regulatory schemes or regimes), or a
macro-level (among regime complexes or populations).
While some may object that our deﬁnition of interaction includes everything
(and therefore explains nothing), at this early stage in theory development it is
important to maintain a broad deﬁnition so as to facilitate comparison across
scales and levels, contexts and theoretical perspectives. Reﬁnement of the
concept can take place at the stage of operationalisation.
To be sure, transnational (business) governance interactions are just one
dimension of transnational law and governance. Our analytical framework and
theoretical criteria do not purport to encompass transnational law as a whole
and are not intended to displace general theories of transnational law. Rather,
they are intended to extend, complement or challenge existing paradigms by insisting on the importance of interactive dynamics and by facilitating systematic theoretical attention to them.
Finally, although we focus here on criteria for explanatory and predictive theories, our analysis is informed by a normative agenda. We wish to understand the
conditions under which governance interactions can advance democracy, justice,
fairness, dignity, prosperity and environmental sustainability. We share with Boaventura de Sousa Santos, John Braithwaite, Peter Drahos and others a desire to
understand and enhance the capacity of structurally disadvantaged interests to participate effectively in transnational governance.36 How can governance interactions enhance popular sovereignty and ratchet up transnational standards in
the interests of ordinary people and the planet?37 When can interaction be a
“weapon of the weak”38 that empowers marginalised interests?
3. Theorising transnational business governance interactions
Transnational governance is a dynamic, co-regulatory and co-evolutionary process
involving state, non-state and hybrid actors and institutions at multiple levels.
36

Eg Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Towards a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and Emancipation (Butterworths, 2002); Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Cesar A
Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan
Legality (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 103.
37
Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 34–36.
38
Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 626.
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These actors and institutions have varied stakes and competencies, perform varied
regulatory functions and interact in diverse ways. Our TBGI analytical framework
has two axes, one representing dimensions of interaction, the other components of
regulatory governance.39 The resulting matrix enables researchers to decide which
aspects of TBGI to analyse for what purposes, while leaving theoretical and methodological choices largely open.
The ﬁrst axis of the framework identiﬁes six features of interaction: the nature
of the interacting entities; the drivers of interaction; the mechanisms and pathways
of interaction; the character of interaction; the effects of interaction; and the temporal dynamics of interaction. Each of these features can be studied at different
points in regulatory governance processes, which the second axis disaggregates
into six components: problem deﬁnition and agenda-setting; norm development;
implementation; monitoring and information gathering; enforcement; and
review and evaluation. Although these components sometimes form a policy
cycle, all are not always present, they have no necessary sequence, and they
may or may not include feedback loops. These are empirical questions to be determined for each case.
The two axes produce a six-by-six matrix with 36 possible combinations. No
study can be expected to address all 36 cells. Most studies will address just one or
a few. The matrix prompts researchers to reﬂect consciously on which components
and dimensions are relevant and facilitates comparison of results and identiﬁcation
of knowledge gaps.
The development and application of this framework provide important guidance as we move to theory building on TBGI. Fundamentally, the complexity
revealed by the framework makes clear that a portfolio of theories is essential.
Diversity of theoretical approaches should be encouraged, but to provide valid
insights, each approach must recognise the complexity of the phenomenon even
if it seeks to explain only a part of it. In our view, any theory of TBGI should
take into account the following features of governance interactions and justify
its focus within and among them:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The
The
The
The
The
The
The

multiplicity of interacting entities and scales of interaction;
co-evolution of agency and structure;
multiple components of regulatory governance;
intermediate position of interaction as both inﬂuence and outcome;
diverse modes of interaction;
mechanisms and pathways of interaction; and
development of interaction over time and space.

These criteria are derived from our analytical framework, especially from the six
features of interaction described above (interacting entities, drivers, mechanisms/
pathways, character, effects, and temporal dynamics). Previously, we articulated
39

Eberlein (n 7).
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these features mainly in terms of descriptive taxonomies.40 Now, we elaborate
deeper criteria for theory building. These criteria reﬂect substantive features of
TBGI, not abstract attributes of theory such as veriﬁability, parsimony or robustness, which are also important. We take up these criteria in turn below, applying
them to the special issue articles and to selected elements of the transnational legal
literature.

3.1

Multiplicity of entities and scales

Any theoretical account of transnational governance interactions must specify who
or what interacts.41 The special issue articles and legal literature identify numerous
candidates, from individuals to social systems and from regulatory instruments to
discourses. Choosing among these is an exercise in theory in which the researcher
posits the nature of the interacting elements and speciﬁes relevant units and levels
of analysis. TBGI researchers should do this in a way that recognises the heterogeneity of interacting entities, the often fuzzy and contingent character of their
boundaries, the frequent multiplicity of their regulatory roles and the multiscalar character of many of their interactions.
Many interacting entities are actors, such as individuals, governments, civil
society organisations and business ﬁrms or associations. Individuals can play
important roles as boundary-crossing norm entrepreneurs. Organisations are inherently complex, functioning simultaneously as actors and as arenas for interaction
by individuals or other organisations.42
Norms, instruments, and discourses also interact, as do regulatory schemes,
regimes, systems and cultures. Their boundaries are even less clearly deﬁned.
Entities like these are both products of social action and social structures in
which actions are embedded. Entities such as networks, epistemic communities
and social movements exhibit characteristics of both actors and structures. No
theory can encompass all actors, norms and social structures, but theories
should recognise the heterogeneity of interacting entities and their roles.
Some illustrations from the legal literature show that there are many ways for theorists to accomplish this. Transnational legal process theory emphasises interaction
among norm entrepreneurs to articulate or interpret norms that guide future interactions, ultimately reconstituting actors’ interests and identities.43 Gregory Shaffer
40

Eberlein (n 7).
Eberlein (n 7) 8.
42
Hancher and Moran suggest that the most important regulatory interactions are between
organisations. Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran, “Organizing Regulatory Space”, in
Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran (eds), Capitalism, Culture and Regulation (Clarendon,
1989) 271.
43
Eg Harold Hongju Koh, “Transnational Legal Process” (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review
181; Harold Hongju Koh, “Internalization through Socialization” (2005) 54 Duke Law
Journal 975.
41
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and Terence Halliday’s transnational legal orders project examines interactions within
the normative structure of transnational law (including legitimacy, clarity and coherence), within national legal systems and between the two.44 Liberal theories posit
multi-level interactions among state, interstate, sub-state and non-state actors,45
while rational-institutionalist theories of legalisation combine interaction among
actors and norms to explain the transnational spread of distinctively legal features.46
Public international lawyers address interactions through concepts such as fragmentation,47 “hard/soft” law interaction,48 and “trade and . . .” conﬂicts.49 Regime complexity theory examines actor strategies within regime complexes.50 These
approaches remain primarily focused on state-based governance.
Other approaches emphasise non-state actors and institutions, including
interactions between interstate and non-state law.51 Kenneth Abbott and

Gregory Shaffer, “The Dimensions and Determinants of State Change”, in Gregory
Shaffer (ed), Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change (Cambridge University
Press, 2013) 23; see also Terrence C Halliday and Gregory Shaffer (eds), Transnational
Legal Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
45
Eg Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law in a World of Liberal States” (1995) 6
European Journal of International Law 503; Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal Theories of
International Law”, in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of The Art (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 83.
46
Eg Kenneth W Abbott and others, “The Concept of Legalization” (2000) 54 International
Organization 401; Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Law, Legalization and Politics:
An Agenda for the Next Generation of IL/IR Scholars”, in Dunoff and Pollack, ibid, 33.
47
Eg Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? PostModern Anxieties” (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 553; Margaret A
Young (ed), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge
University Press, 2012); Harro van Asselt, The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance: Consequences and Management of Regime Interactions (Edward Elgar, 2014).
48
Eg Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance” (2000) 54 International Organization 421; John J Kirton and Michael J Trebilcock
(eds), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment, and
Social Governance (Ashgate, 2004); Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack, “Hard vs Soft:
Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International Governance” (2010) 94 Minnesota Law Review 706.
49
Eg David W Leebron, “Linkages” (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 5;
Joost Pauwelyn, Conﬂict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates
to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
50
Eg Kal Raustiala and David G Victor, “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic
Resources” (2004) 58 International Organization 277; Laurence R Helfer, “Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System” (2009) 7 (1) Perspectives on Politics
39; Kal Raustiala, “Institutional Proliferation and the International Legal Order”, in Dunoff
and Pollack (n 45) 293, 294.
51
Eg Hanneke van Schooten and Jonathan Verschuuren (eds), International Governance
and Law: State Regulation and Non-State Law (Edward Elgar, 2008); Math Noortmann
and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law: From LawTakers to Law-Makers (Ashgate, 2010).
44
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Duncan Snidal locate interactions among diverse actors and institutions on a
“governance triangle” formed by the state, business and civil society.52 Abbott
also applies regime complexity theory to non-state governance.53 Theories of
transnational private regulation capture interactions within deterritorialised
regulatory regimes,54 but typically overlook inter-regime interactions, with
notable exceptions including accounts of transnational meta-regulation.55
Transgovernmental approaches explore cross-border interactions among
courts, legislatures, regulatory agencies, subnational governments and international secretariats, often via networks.56 Others examine the crucial role of
intermediaries such as lawyers.57 Comparative law has developed potentially
fruitful analytical frameworks that combine the interaction of norm entrepreneurs, communities, legal structures and technological systems to explain
legal transplantation and norm diffusion.58
Contemporary theories of regulation and “new governance” examine bargaining and intermediation among individuals and organisations that span the public–
private divide.59 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos consider interactions among

Kenneth W Abbot and Duncan Snidal, “The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards
Institutions and the Shadow of the State”, in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds), The
Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 44.
53
Kenneth W Abbott, “The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change” (2012) 30
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 571; Kenneth W Abbott, “Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change” (2014) 3 Transnational
Environmental Law 57.
54
Eg Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the
Regulation of Integrating Markets (Hart, 2005).
55
Eg Jacco Bomhoff and Anne Meuwese, “The Meta-Regulation of Transnational Private
Regulation” (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 138; Colin Scott, “Beyond Taxonomies
of Private Authority in Private Regulation” (2012) 13 German Law Journal 1329.
56
Eg Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Accountability of Government Networks” (2001) 8
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 347; Kal Raustiala, “The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law”
(2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 1; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World
Order (Princeton University Press, 2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Global Community
of Courts” (2003) 44 (1) Harvard International Law Journal 191.
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Globalization (Routledge, 2011).
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in Peter Cornelius and Bruce Kogut (eds), Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a
Global Economy (Oxford University Press, 2003) 347.
59
Eg Julia Black, “Proceduralizing Regulation, Part I” (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 597; Julia Black, “Proceduralizing Regulation, Part II” (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 33; Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103; Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and
Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Scott (n 28); Orly Lobel, “The Renew
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actors (individuals, organisations and states), normative principles and regulatory
webs.60 Theories of international regulatory competition and co-opetition
emphasise interactions between national legal systems61 but bring non-state
actors in to a certain degree.62 In a similar vein, theories of multi-level governance
involve horizontal, vertical and “diagonal” interactions among actors and jurisdictions at different scales.63 Robert Ahdieh’s concept of dialectical regulation
focuses on inter-systemic interactions,64 while experimentalist governance
involves recursive interactions among central and decentralised units of various
kinds.65
Some transnational legal pluralists examine interactions among legal orders or
cultures,66 others among structural sites and strategic actors.67 In Santos’s conception of interlegality, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic legalities interact in

Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought”
(2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342; John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It
Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better (Edward Elgar, 2008).
60
Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15).
61
Eg William Bratton and others (eds), International Regulatory Competition and Coordination: Perspectives on Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States (Clarendon,
1996).
62
Eg Daniel C Esty and Damien Geradin, “Regulatory Co-opetition”, in Daniel C Esty and
Damien Geradin (eds), Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration (Oxford University Press, 2001); Damien Geradin and Joseph A McCahery, “Regulatory Co-opetition:
Transcending the Regulatory Competition Debate”, in Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur
(eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Edward Elgar, 2004) 90, 112–114.
63
Eg Hari M Osofsky, “The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for
Transnational Regulatory Governance” (2005) 83 Washington University Law Quarterly
1789; Robert A Schapiro, “From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism” (2006)
56 Emory Law Journal 1 (introduction to special issue on interactive federalism); Hari
M Osofsky, “Is Climate Change ‘International’? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role”
(2009) 49 Virginia Journal of International Law 585.
64
Robert B Ahdieh, “Dialectical Regulation” (2006) 38 Connecticut Law Review 863; see
also Robert A Schapiro, “Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a PostWestphalian World” (2007) 57 Emory Law Journal 115; Paul Schiff Berman, “Dialectical
Regulation, Territoriality, and Pluralism” (2006) 38 Connecticut Law Review 929.
65
Charles F Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, “Experimentalist Governance”, in David LeviFaur (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2012) 169;
Christine Overdevest and Jonathan Zeitlin, “Assembling an Experimentalist Regime:
Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest Sector” (2014) 8 Regulation and
Governance 22.
66
Eg Sally Falk Moore, “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an
Appropriate Subject of Study” (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719; John Grifﬁths, “What
is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofﬁcial Law 1; Sally
Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism” (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869; Ralph Grillo,
Roger Ballard, Alessandro Ferrari, André J Hoekema, Marcel Maussen and Prakash
Shah (eds), Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity (Ashgate, 2009).
67
Eg Francis G Snyder, “Governing Globalisation”, in Michael Likosky (ed), Transnational
Legal Processes: Globalisation and Power Disparities (Butterworths, 2002) 65.
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collisions among “rival normative ideas, knowledges, power forms, symbolic universes and agencies”.68 Oren Perez studies interactions among state-based, nonstate and hybrid organisations and regimes within a “complex discursive labyrinth”.69 Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen’s theory of “rough consensus
and running code” involves interactions between actors and social structures,
including norms, regimes, cultures and spaces.70 Finally, at the structural end of
the agency-structure continuum, Gunther Teubner’s systems theory involves interaction among autopoietically closed social subsystems, including formal organisations and functionally differentiated societal subsystems.71
Halliday and Shaffer contend that the boundaries between interacting legal
orders are ﬁxed by discourses, ideological frames, subjective perceptions, alliances and conﬂicts.72 These elements are contestable and hard to measure,
however. The fuzzy, permeable and contingent character of interacting entities
can raise difﬁcult issues of individuation, since “interaction is often more like
that between waves or clouds or rivulets than between hard, stable entities like
rocks or billiard balls”.73 Similar considerations lead Fleur Johns to urge scholars
to focus on the “hyphen” between intersecting legal orders: the shifting spaces in
which legal systems are constituted mutually by their encounters with one
another.74
Another important feature of interactions is the multiplicity of regulatory roles
that actors often perform simultaneously. A business ﬁrm, for example, might
implement standards and participate in standard-setting; a transnational governance scheme might set standards and also be subject to meta-rules. In short, transnational business governance involves “many kinds of actors which regulate while
being regulated themselves”.75
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Finally, theoretical accounts of TBGI should recognise that interaction frequently occurs at and across multiple scales. Micro-level analyses examine how
individual actors (people or organisations) interact within a regulatory scheme
or jurisdiction to create, implement or enforce standards. Much of the theoretical
literature on regulation,76 especially transnational private regulation,77 follows this
approach, examining interactions among rule makers, targets, interpreters, enforcers or beneﬁciaries. Meso-level analyses examine how regulatory jurisdictions or
schemes interact, in regimes or organisational ﬁelds, and how norms, discourses,
cultures and other institutions enable and constrain action.78 Finally, macrolevel analyses explore how entire regimes or organisational ﬁelds intersect
within larger complexes79 or systems,80 and how the latter entities interact with
one another.
We argue elsewhere that meso-level analyses are initially the most fruitful,
because they provide “sufﬁcient abstraction to identify patterns and trends,
without sacriﬁcing empirical detail”.81 Yet we do not advocate an exclusive
meso-level focus. Interactions often link different levels; they may occur simultaneously within a regulatory scheme (micro) and with other schemes (meso).
Moreover, interactions frequently cut across geographic scales, from local to

Eg Robert W Hahn and Roger G Noll, “Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution
Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions” (1983) 1 Yale Journal on Regulation 63; Ian
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global. A fruitful theoretical portfolio should encompass the micro and meso
levels, the meso and macro levels, or all three.
Table 1 provisionally (and contestably) locates a range of theoretical
approaches on the continuum of scale. Strikingly, most approaches either squarely
address the meso level or straddle that level and one or both of the others. This
accords with our own recommendation and provides the basis for a fruitful theoretical portfolio.
Turning to the articles in this special issue, John Biggins and Colin Scott do not
theorise interacting entities explicitly, but their account of TBGI in the ﬁeld of
ﬁnancial derivatives is squarely actor-centred. Biggins and Scott focus on interactions among the key organisations involved in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives regulation before and after the global ﬁnancial crisis, including the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), ﬁnancial regulators,
courts and ﬁnancial ﬁrms. They examine simultaneous micro-level interactions
within ISDA and meso-level interactions between ISDA and other organisations.
These interactions cut across geographic scales, between the global ISDA Master
Agreement and national laws. Their case study invites further theorisation of these
interactions.
Karin Buhmann’s study of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights identiﬁes a wide range of interacting entities, including organisations (eg
UN Human Rights Council), societal segments (eg civil society), individuals (eg
John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on business
and human rights (“SRSG”)), and regulatory schemes (eg UN Guiding Principles,
UN Global Compact, OECD Guidelines, and national laws). Buhmann’s focus on
relationships among regulatory instruments is particularly intriguing.
It is not always clear in this analysis who or what is interacting. In our terms,
however, Buhmann offers a micro-level analysis of interactions at the rule formation stage, focusing on the SRSG’s enrollment of private and public actors.
Later, she presents a meso-level analysis of interactions between the UN
Guiding Principles and other programs at the implementation stage, with a
focus on mutual “piggy-backing” by these programs to enhance their legitimacy
and effectiveness. Her account shows that scales of interaction and analysis can
shift as activity moves from one component of the regulatory process to
another. It also invites theoretical attention to the relations among actors, instruments, institutions and discourses.
Kernaghan Webb also identiﬁes a variety of interacting entities in his study of
the International Organisation for Standardisation’s ISO 26000 social responsibility guidance standard. These include organisations (eg ISO and other instrument
developers), individuals (eg Working Group experts), regulatory instruments (eg
ISO 9000 and 14001; ILO Core Conventions), norms (eg due diligence and
Plan-Do-Check-Act), issue areas (eg labour, human rights and environment) and
societal sectors (public, private and civil society). While Webb paints a rich
picture, it is again not always clear which of these are interacting at any speciﬁc
point.
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Table 1.

Micro-, meso- and macro-level theoretical perspectives on governance interactions

Level of analysis/scale of
interaction

Examples of theoretical
perspectives

Micro
Meso
Macro
(Individual actors interact within a (Jurisdictions or schemes interact within (Regimes or ﬁelds interact within
given jurisdiction or scheme)
regimes or ﬁelds; regimes, ﬁelds and complexes or systems; complexes
discourses shape actors)
or systems interact with one
another)
Fragmentation of international law
Orchestration
Legalisation
Institutional theories of regulation
Regulatory competition, co-opetition
Multilevel governance

Micro and meso combined
International/transnational legal process
Transnational legal orders
Constructivist international relations/international law theory
Liberal international relations/international law theory
Transgovernmental networks
(Transnational) private regulation
Experimentalist governance
(Global) legal pluralism
Rough Consensus, Running Code
Micro, meso and macro combined
Global business regulation
Systems theory

Ensemble regulation

Meso and macro combined
Regime complexity
Interlegality

S. Wood et al.

Public and private interest theories
of regulation
Social norms
Enrolment
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Webb’s account shows that interactions can occur and be analysed simultaneously at the micro, meso and macro levels. It also indicates, like Buhmann’s,
that the nature and scale of interaction can shift across regulatory governance components. At the rule formation stage, Webb traces a combination of micro-level
interactions within ISO and meso-level interactions between ISO and competitor
organisations. At the implementation stage, he describes meso-level interactions
among ISO, states and business actors to solidify ISO 26000′s status as a global
custom, and macro-level interactions between this custom and domestic legal
systems.
Webb also shows ISO to be a multi-level, multi-scalar arena for interaction.
First, ISO is a meta-organisation of national standards bodies and international
organisations. As a result, it is a powerful convener; interactions between ISO
and other standard-setters occur both outside and within ISO, blurring the line
between micro and meso. Secondly, ISO standards are drafted by individual
experts acting in a personal capacity, while standards are approved by national
standards organisations. Thirdly, ISO is the pinnacle of a deep and broad standardisation infrastructure spanning subnational, national and transnational spheres.
Fourthly, in developing ISO 26000, ISO organised experts into stakeholder categories, encouraging transnational collaboration within and between them. The
process thus encompassed diverse cross-actor and cross-scale interactions. It
would be fascinating to theorise these features, identify other organisations
where they appear and investigate their role in TBGI.
David Doorey is alone among the authors in this special issue in devoting substantial attention to theory development. He identiﬁes two categories of interacting
entities in the development of a living wage norm in transnational codes of
conduct for supply chains: organisations and social subsystems. He ﬁrst examines
interactions among diverse NGOs, labour unions, ﬁrms, trade associations, governments, and standards schemes within a TBG social subsystem. Doorey emphasises heterogeneity within as well as between categories and even individual
actors. He also examines interactions between the TBG subsystem and other subsystems in its environment.
Doorey develops a model of TBGI grounded in the theory of open systems.
His model links the micro-level of interaction (among individuals, NGOs and
ﬁrms) to the meso-level (among transnational regulatory schemes) and the
macro-level (between societal subsystems). Here again, the scale of interaction
shifts over time: from micro-level, conﬂictual interactions between NGOs and
business; to meso-level competition between TBG schemes; and to multi-level
interactions that facilitated the spread of the living wage norm from NGO-led to
business-led schemes. Macro-level interactions among social subsystems conditioned all these interactions.
Doorey’s individuation of the TBG subsystem raises some questions.
Treating it as a single, functionally autonomous system might obscure both its
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in-between-ness82 and its internal heterogeneity.83 This limitation notwithstanding, Doorey’s model provides one possible answer to the theoretical challenge
of capturing the multi-scalar and multi-level character of governance interactions.

3.2 Co-evolution of agency and structure
Theoretical frameworks that focus only on structural features such as institutions,
discourses, cultures, technological systems or social systems without attending to
actors and their interests and resources, or that analyse strategic action in isolation
from the social structures in which it occurs, will fail to grasp all the dynamics of
governance interactions. Structural elements help constitute actors’ identities and
possibilities for action, and are in turn constituted, reproduced and transformed by
actors’ actions. Whether a theoretical perspective emphasises agency or structure,
therefore, it should recognise this mutual constitution and co-evolution.
Theories that emphasise reﬂexivity, co-evolution and mutual interaction
between agency and structure will have particularly strong purchase. This includes
most institutionalist, experimentalist, socio-legal, pluralist and legal-process
approaches described above.84 It also includes constructivist theories of international law, which assume the mutual construction of social structures and
actors’ identities and choices.85 In Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope’s interactional theory, for example, normative structures are constructed, reproduced and
transformed via interaction between intersubjective norm-creation and actors’
ongoing practices of legality.86
Other approaches to the agency-structure challenge can also be valuable. Consider the two theoretical perspectives in the bottom row of Table 1; both engage
micro-, meso- and macro-level interactions simultaneously, yet offer contrasting
perspectives on agency-structure interaction.
Braithwaite and Drahos seek to explain how micro-level actions “constitute
structural change, just as those micro processes are constituted and constrained”
by macro structures.87 They theorise micro–macro sequences of regulatory globalisation in which entrepreneurs promote a regulatory innovation and enrol
82
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organisational power via webs of dialogue. The innovation spreads through modeling, eventually becoming a standard.88 Braithwaite and Drahos also theorise a
forum-shifting sequence.89 In our terms, this is a meso-level phenomenon in
which an actor moves a regulatory agenda from one forum to another, abandons
a forum, pursues an agenda in multiple fora or blocks a forum from acting.90
Forum-shifting is used by a range of state and non-state actors.91 Business
groups’ creation of their own forestry certiﬁcation schemes to divert the forest certiﬁcation agenda away from the multi-stakeholder Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) is an example.92 More recently, the FSC and its main industry-led competitor failed in a joint bid to block ISO from taking up the sustainable forestry standardisation agenda,93 while consumer and business interests succeeded in making
ISO an alternative to the ILO as a forum for developing global labour-related standards.94 A closely related strategy of institutional bypass has been used by nonstate actors to get around intergovernmental fora.95 Forum-shifting and institutional bypass are promising strategies by which micro- or meso-level interaction
can produce macro-level change.
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While Braithwaite and Drahos recognise the co-evolution of agency and structure, their account is fundamentally actor-centred.96 They insist that “explanation
is not indissolubly linked to social systems”, and they “take seriously the intentionality of agents and the ways in which their beliefs and desires can lead them
to change their regulatory worlds”.97 This has the advantage of clearly identifying
the drivers of regulatory interaction (goal-seeking agency). Yet there are also other
potentially fruitful avenues for investigation, including interactions among norms,
discourses or social systems; logics of contradiction, juxtaposition and contingency; and uncalculated interactions such as institutional isomorphism.98
Teubner’s theory of autopoietically closed systems offers a contrasting perspective on the agency-structure relationship.99 Although this theory might
appear to offer a purely macro-level analysis, it actually spans all three levels.
Interaction takes place between societal subsystems (macro) and between organisations (micro and meso). Every attempt to regulate an organisation involves
inter-systemic interaction; all inter-systemic interactions must pass through the
“eye of the needle” of individual communicative events.100 Teubner’s interactive
mechanisms of blind co-evolution, information and interference101 operate simultaneously at all three levels. But autonomous human agents take a back seat. Social
systems are constituted by communications, not by human beings.102 The theory
of autopoietic systems thus offers a radically limited account of the co-evolution of
agency and structure.
Doorey’s use of open systems theory offers an alternative. It combines macrolevel interactions among social subsystems with micro-level interactions among
individuals and organisations. Within the TBG subsystem, actors interact via
varied pathways and mechanisms to produce regulatory rules and behavioural
change. Internal feedback loops link these outputs back to actors, while external
feedback loops link them to economic, legal and other subsystems, which in
turn provide inputs to the TBG subsystem.103 The co-evolution of agency and
structure is central to Doorey’s model. Alignment or conﬂict among actors’
goals, values and risk perceptions is a powerful driver of interaction, but actors’
characteristics—and the choices available to them—evolve in response to
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structural forces. This approach suggests the possibility of breaking open the
“black box” of actor characteristics and examining their relation to social
structures.104
Calliess and Zumbansen’s Rough Consensus and Running Code (RCRC) offers
another systems theory-inspired perspective. On one hand, the fragmentation of
society into autonomous, functionally differentiated, law-creating subsystems
with competing rationalities creates the structures that shape actors’ identities and
possibilities for action (macro).105 On the other hand, actors’ interactions generate
the rough consensus that congeals into a subsystem’s running code and drives its
continual evolution (micro).106 The RCRC model provides a promising theoretical
frame for analysing interactions among actors, norms and social structures.
Turning to other articles in this special issue, Biggins and Scott hint at a
subtle relationship between the ISDA and market-wide institutional structures.
For example, the Master Agreement and close-out netting procedures devised by
ISDA were adopted so widely that they became part of the institutional structure
of the derivatives market. As such, they helped moderate the global ﬁnancial
crisis in that market, leading powerful states to enhance ISDA’s agency further.
Buhmann hints at another agency-structure relationship. By combining an
actor-centred negotiation history with discourse analysis, she illustrates the
mutual construction of small-scale agency and large-scale discursive structures,
including the strategic deployment of discourse to inﬂuence action.107 Theorising
these agency/structure interactions would be a welcome next step.

3.3

The components of regulatory governance

Our analytical framework identiﬁes six components of regulatory governance:
agenda-setting, norm formation, implementation, monitoring, enforcement and
review.108 Whatever theoretical frameworks they apply, researchers should recognise that regulatory governance has such components, and that interactions can
occur within any of them. This divisibility also invites theory development.
Each component “demands a different portfolio of resources or capacities, including ﬁnancial resources, organisational capacity, expertise, legitimacy, and strategic
position”.109 Each can, moreover, involve different actors and display distinct
interactive dynamics, as Buhmann and Webb show.110
104
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Much of the legal literature examines only one or two components, most commonly norm formation111 and enforcement (adjudication).112 Margaret Young,
Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel are among the scholars calling for attention to a
broader range of regulatory processes.113 Analysing interactive dynamics within
and among different components will be a valuable area of theory building.
The articles in this issue illustrate the opportunities. Scott has elsewhere emphasised the importance of looking beyond standard-setting in transnational private
regulation,114 and he and Biggins do so in their article. They trace how interactions
expanded from agenda-setting and norm formation to implementation and enforcement. Interactions in agenda-setting and rule formation included micro-level bargaining among dealer banks to produce the ISDA Master Agreement and mesolevel interaction in which ISDA drafted and governments enacted OTC derivatives-friendly legislation. Here the outputs of micro-level interactions (boilerplate
contracts) were inputs to meso-level interactions, reinforcing ISDA’s lobbying
for self-regulation. Once the ISDA self-regulatory regime achieved global dominance, governments implicitly endowed it with additional interpretative and adjudicative responsibilities, exercised mainly by newly formed credit derivatives
determination committees (DCs). DCs have unusual signiﬁcance because of their
impact on the ﬁnancial positions of states and their creditors.
Buhmann discusses all six components of regulatory governance, showing
how the nature and scale of interaction change as activities shift from one component to another. During agenda-setting, micro-level interactions within the
UN human rights apparatus evolved from competition to coordination. During
rule formation, micro and meso interactions blended together, shifting to cooptation and meta-regulation as the UN Guiding Principles achieved dominance.
During implementation, the focus shifted again, to meso-level mutual “piggybacking” by the UN Guiding Principles and other programs.
Doorey’s article illustrates how conﬂict during rule formation (over deﬁning a
living wage) can be diverted into cooperation at the implementation stage (where
experimentation with implementation strategies led to agreement on a “wage
ladder” approach). It also indicates, however, that the result may be merely to
defer rather than to resolve conﬂict.
Webb’s study invites theorisation on two points. First, the same interactions may
affect multiple components of regulation simultaneously. For example, interactions
over implementation of ISO 26000 occur partly within state and interstate norm
development processes. One scheme’s implementation may thus be another’s
norm formation, involving similar actors and interactions. Secondly, the article
111
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Eg Jessup (n 1).
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suggests that organisations’ pre-existing legitimacy endowments inﬂuence interactions across multiple components. ISO’s legitimacy as a global standards-setter
facilitated its assertion of authority over social responsibility (SR) standards at the
agenda-setting stage. During norm development, it allowed ISO to steer competition
with rival SR standard-setters into co-opetition within ISO. During implementation,
the widespread acceptance of the ISO management systems standards on which ISO
26000 was modelled facilitated business uptake of the new standard.
In sum, scholars of TBGI should turn their attention to theorising interactions
within and across the components of regulatory governance. Important questions
for theory development include whether particular components have peculiar
interaction dynamics; whether those dynamics change when interactions relate
simultaneously to multiple components; how interactions in one component inﬂuence those in another; how linkages between components can be exploited to
manage regulatory interactions; where feedback loops are likely to emerge; and
how organisational legitimacy endowments inﬂuence interactions throughout
the regulatory governance process.
3.4

The intermediate position of interaction

Theories of transnational governance interaction must recognise that interactions
occupy a dual position. On one hand, they are the results of conditions, forces and
actions that inﬂuence who or what will interact, when and how. On the other hand,
interactions affect the design of regulatory institutions, the nature and content of
regulation, the perceptions and behaviour of regulated actors, and other downstream conditions.
A range of factors drives interaction.115 Actor-level drivers include alignment
or conﬂict of goals, perceptions and interests, and overlapping scope of activity.116
System-level drivers include functional differentiation of society into subsystems
with different logics;117 duplication or inconsistency of rules;118 and governance
gaps created by globalisation and the transformation of the state.119 Other relevant
factors include problem structure,120 industry structure,121 technical systems,122
discursive structures and cultures.
115
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Eg Doorey, this issue, 441–43.
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Governance Interactions” (2014) 8 Regulation & Governance 110.
116

356

S. Wood et al.

Turning to effects, the ultimate goal of our research agenda is to explain and
predict the impacts of governance interactions on social, political and environmental conditions.123 However, such impacts are very difﬁcult to determine,
given the complexity of causal and other relations and the multiplicity of contributing factors beyond regulation (let alone regulatory interactions). These points
have important implications for TBGI theory building. We focus here on two:
choosing the object of inquiry and integrating drivers and effects.
First, if it is not practicable to assess directly the social impacts of governance
interactions, what is the most fruitful proxy? The most common alternatives are
outputs and outcomes.124 Outputs of interaction include regulatory standards and
institutional design features. Outcomes include changes in behaviour, values or perceptions. Ideally, scholars should seek to theorise how interactions affect the outputs
and outcomes not only of single governance schemes but of entire governance
regimes.
In studying outputs, theories of institutional isomorphism,125 norm
diffusion126 and regulatory races127 are relevant. Of particular interest are theories
explaining how races become ratchets. Braithwaite and Drahos argue that
certain principles can combine to prevent reversal of a regulatory race’s direction,
transforming a race into a ratchet.128 They theorise the conditions for this to
occur and give numerous illustrations. Multiple ratchets are particularly powerful.
In forestry, for example, principles of rule compliance and continuous
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Eberlein (n 7) 13.
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Journal of Sociology 297; Klaus Dingwerth and Philip Pattberg, “World Politics and Organizational Fields: The Case of Transnational Sustainability Governance” (2009) 15 European
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Regulation” (2011) 24 Governance 359.
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Mary L Volcansek (eds), Globalizing Justice: Critical Perspectives on Transnational
Law and the Cross-Border Migration of Legal Norms (State University of New York
Press, 2010).
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improvement in national law, ISO 14001 and the FSC create multiple ratchets,
each driving regulatory standards up and all of them together preventing
backsliding.129
In addition to behavioural change, outcomes can include dialogue, information
sharing, shared understandings, policy learning, and changed values, perceptions
or expectations. They may also include heightened hostility or mistrust. As
Doorey notes, such outcomes can emerge even without formal outputs such as
rules.130
We propose focusing on one outcome in particular: changes in the capacity of
regulatory governance actors, schemes and systems.131 Scholars should investigate how interactions affect the mobilisation of motivations, competences and
resources along governance chains, and how capacities affect the performance
of regulatory systems—in the narrow sense of making rules and shaping practices.
The motivations, competences and resources that must be enrolled are controlled
by a variety of actors, who may be unwilling or unable to contribute, leaving
the regulatory system without essential capacities and jeopardising its
performance.
Do interacting schemes reinforce one another and promote diverse solutions132
through innovation, experimentation, learning and adaptability?133 Or do they
work at cross-purposes, facilitating forum-shopping for the least stringent
rules?134 What conditions—eg, shared interests, goals and cognitive understandings—are associated with successful mobilisation and orchestration of actors
and resources? Bruno Latour’s concept of enrolment (the interactive process of
mobilising other actors and their resources in support of an actor’s regulatory

129
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Chinese, and United States Support for Legality Compliance of Internationally Traded Products” (2014) 8 Regulation & Governance 49; Lars H Gulbrandsen, “Dynamic Governance
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(2014) 8 Regulation & Governance 74.
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goals) should be fruitful here.135 Yet questions remain, including which indicators
of capacity to adopt, how to isolate the effects of interaction from other factors,
and how to assess the independent effect of capacity constraints on regulatory performance. There is also a need to theorise the effects of interaction on governance
capacity in deeper senses, including democracy, legitimacy, openness, transparency and accountability.136
A second challenge for theory is to integrate a backward-looking focus on the
drivers of interaction with a forward-looking analysis of its effects. The phenomena they capture are closely intertwined in the regulatory process. Problem structure, for example, is both a background condition that shapes interaction and at
least partly the product of discursive interaction.137 This challenge can be
addressed in many ways, including applying a single theoretical frame to
drivers and effects, and drawing on multiple theoretical tools to wrestle with
drivers, effects or both.
In this special issue, Biggins and Scott offer a functional account of the drivers
of governance interactions in derivatives markets. Increasingly complex ﬁnancial
transactions and the liberalisation of state regulation created a governance gap,
prompting demand from market actors for coordination and sporadic pressure
from states for industry self-regulation. The resulting interactions between state
and industry actors had three main effects: the emergence of a hybrid public/
private governance regime; ISDA’s consolidation as the dominant non-state regulator; and further enhancement of ISDA’s regulatory role following the global
ﬁnancial crisis.
Drawing on Tim Büthe’s study of the International Electro-technical Commission,138 the authors explain ISDA’s dominance as a result of state support and
ISDA’s neutralisation of competitors, both explicitly interactive processes. They
explain ISDA’s remarkable resilience as a result of industry structure. They
endorse Daniel Mügge’s theory that industries dominated by highly organised producers can, despite exogenous shocks, deﬁne regulatory agendas and resist state
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Social Construction of Scientiﬁc Facts (Princeton University Press, 1986); Peter Grabosky,
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intervention in complex areas by offering to tighten self-regulation in exchange for
public oversight.139
Governance interactions in the derivatives regime enhanced the regulatory
capacities of both ISDA and states. ISDA was able to enroll states’ legislative
and enforcement capacities in support of its regulatory agenda. State endorsement
conferred legitimacy on ISDA and facilitated its dominance. For their part,
states enrolled ISDA’s rulemaking and communication capacity to compensate
for their limited expertise and legitimacy. The results are unstable, however.
ISDA must walk a political tightrope between maximising regulatory share and
angering state policy makers, especially in systemically important areas like sovereign debt.
Buhmann also offers a functionalist account of drivers, but points additionally to actors’ interests, values and perceptions. These can be manipulated, as
with the SRSG’s discursive strategy of articulating stakeholders’ interests in
cooperation, which ampliﬁed their drivers to interact. Buhmann also cites differences in geopolitics and in institutional locus and mandates to explain why
interaction was more collaborative under the SRSG than previously.
The effects of interaction at the agenda-setting stage were a shared understanding of the need for a transnational governance instrument on business
and human rights; at the norm-formation stage, the result was the UN
Guiding Principles themselves; and at the implementation stage, the effects
were normative homogenisation and mutually enhanced regulatory capacity.
In the face of member states’ reluctance to regulate business directly, the regulatory capacity of UN human rights organs was enhanced by enrolling non-state
actors in rulemaking and by piggy-backing on other TBG schemes to complement the Principles’ limited implementation and enforcement modalities.
The piggy-backing also worked in the other direction: the UN Human Rights
Council’s endorsement of the Principles allowed other TBG initiatives that
incorporated the Principles to expand their membership, audiences and regulatory space.
In contrast to these functionalist accounts, the drivers of interaction in
Doorey’s open systems model are actors’ goals, values, risk perceptions, power
and capacity, which evolve in response to internal and external forces. Doorey’s
main focus, however, is on the effects of interaction: the outputs and outcomes
of the TBG subsystem. The main output was the transformation of the living
wage norm from “an outlier . . . to a norm found in most leading TBG schemes
targeting global supply chain labour practices”.140 Despite this normative convergence, however, there is little evidence of behavioural change. Ironically,
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agreement on rules (outputs) is sometimes possible only because they require little
behavioural change (outcomes). Finally, Doorey emphasises the difﬁculty of
measuring effects other than regulatory outputs, of isolating interactions from
other causal variables, and of predicting whether interaction will have salutary
or deleterious effects.
Webb’s main contribution here is his examination, discussed above, of the
effect of legitimacy endowments on the character and trajectory of interactions.
This highlights the intertwined nature of drivers and effects. ISO’s legitimacy
endowment enabled it to attract unprecedented participation by intergovernmental
organs, which in turn conferred legitimacy on ISO 26000. Webb also emphasises
the importance of institutional design. He argues that ISO’s publicly accessible,
transparent, multi-stakeholder consensus process mitigated dominance by any
one actor category, enhanced ISO 26000′s legitimacy, ensured that it
genuinely approximated a global societal consensus, and facilitated widespread
acceptance.

3.5 Modes of interaction
While some legal scholars, like Jessup, focus on a narrow range of interactions
such as conﬂict, harmonisation, or cooperation,141 many identify greater
variety.142 Theoretical approaches should embrace this diversity, treating the
Eg Jessup (n 1) (conﬂict); Marianne Constable, “Afterword: Conﬂicts as a Law of
Laws?” (2008) 71:3 Law and Contemporary Problems 343 (conﬂict and harmonization);
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character of interaction as an empirical question, not an assumption. While
descriptive typologies have value,143 they do not capture all the observed complexity. The challenges for theory include explaining why interaction takes particular forms, how certain forms overlap or transform into others, and how
forms vary across scales or levels of interaction. In the latter connection, theories
of meso-level, inter-scheme interactions such as orchestration144 and meta-regulation145 are likely to be particularly fruitful.
In this special issue, Biggins and Scott show the complexity of cooperative
interactions. Interactions between ISDA and state actors included ISDA’s enrolment of state regulatory capacity; its oversight of governments (through model
laws, lobbying and strategic litigation); state recognition of ISDA self-regulation;
implicit state delegation of authority to ISDA DCs; and state cooptation of potentially subversive non-state regulation through selective incorporation. Here the
drivers of conﬂict and cooperation produced a delicate, continually renegotiated
balance between state and non-state regulation.
Buhmann demonstrates how the character of interaction can change over time,
across institutional settings, and among components of regulatory governance. Interactions shifted from conﬂict to cooperation at the agenda-setting stage and to cooptation and meta-regulation at the rule formation stage; cooptation largely continued
during implementation. The earlier-described mutual enrolment and piggy-backing
by the UN Guiding Principles and other TBG schemes suggests a form of symbiosis

Journal of Comparative and International Law 473, 489 (symbiosis, subsumption, imitation, convergence, adaptation, partial integration, avoidance, subordination, repression,
and destruction).
143
Eg Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Judicial Globalization” (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 1103 (identifying ﬁve forms of judicial interaction); David Trubek and Louise
G Trubek, “New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation” (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 539 (identifying three kinds of
interaction between non-state and state legal orders); Dinah Shelton (ed), International Law
and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford University Press, 2011) (identifying three categories of interaction between international and
domestic legal systems); Eberlein (n 7) 11–12 (identifying four categories of TBGI).
144
Kenneth WAbbott and Duncan Snidal, “Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deﬁcit” (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 501; Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO Performance
through Orchestration” (2010) 5 Review of International Organizations 315; Philip Schleifer, “Orchestrating Sustainability: The Case of European Union Biofuel Governance”
(2013) 7(1) Regulation & Governance 533–546; Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal,
“Taking Responsive Regulation Transnational: Strategies for International Organizations”
(2013) 7 Regulation & Governance 97; Kenneth Abbott and others (eds), International
Organizations as Orchestrators (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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that may not be captured by conventional concepts of cooperation. These increasingly integrative interactions produced norm convergence, consolidation of the
Guiding Principles’ dominance and the resurgence of state authority in this ﬁeld.
Doorey emphasises the simultaneity of competition and cooperation. From the
time NGOs formed the Workers’ Rights Consortium as an alternative to industry
codes of conduct, inter-scheme competition combined with dialogue and
cooperation. Co-opetition continued even after the leading schemes deﬁned
common standards for pilot testing. The six participating schemes competed to
have their standards adopted, yet also agreed to favour the highest standards
within the six schemes—including a living wage clause.
Co-opetition also plays a key role in Webb’s study. Co-opetition occurs when
“rule instrument developers that are in other respects in competition with each
other, may for strategic reasons recognise an opportunity for collaboration for
their mutual beneﬁt”.146 Webb investigates the drivers and effects of this mode
of interaction. Drivers include competitors’ desires to align their rule instruments,
advance their own agendas through competitors’ schemes, and enjoy the legitimacy-enhancing beneﬁt of association with other schemes. In this case, co-opetition led to endorsement of ISO 26000 by intergovernmental organisations,
governments, TBG schemes, transnational corporations and NGOs. It also produced regulatory synergies, with competitor schemes articulating general principles and ISO 26000 providing detailed standards and guidance.
The processes of normative convergence and diffusion described by
Buhmann, Doorey and Webb deserve greater attention. Which norms spread to
which governance schemes, and why? If norms do not spread, why not? Is co-opetition a special case, or a broader phenomenon? Is it more likely to strengthen or
weaken regulatory standards, and to enhance or degrade regulatory capacity?
3.6 Mechanisms and pathways of interaction
Specifying and theorising the mechanisms and pathways that link drivers, interactions and effects holds great promise for middle-level theory building. An
understanding of mechanisms and pathways offers substantial purchase on interactive dynamics. Such understanding also helps identify the opportunities for
structurally weak parties to remake their regulatory worlds.147 At the same time,
Abbott and Snidal warn that mechanisms are “challenging analytical tools”:
They are often difﬁcult to identify and analyze in practice. They require the
development of “stylized facts”, so that detailed descriptions do not obscure
analytical insights. They may be complex . . . multiple mechanisms may be at
work.148
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Mechanisms are normally deﬁned in causal terms: they “specify the microlevel elements . . . through which causal factors operate”.149 In the context of
global business regulation, Braithwaite and Drahos deﬁne them as “shortish
causal chains”150 “that increase the extent to which patterns of regulation in one
part of the world are similar, or linked, to patterns of regulation in other
parts”.151 In many accounts, actors exploit mechanisms instrumentally.152 Mechanisms may also operate unintentionally, as in Teubner’s “blind co-evolution” of
systems via quasi-biological mechanisms of variation and selection.153 For our
purposes, mechanisms and pathways emphasise causal logics, but can also accommodate broader forms of explanation.
Elsewhere, we canvass numerous mechanisms and pathways of TBGI, including norm entrepreneurship, enrolment, meta-regulation, experimentalism, rule
incorporation, conditional rule referencing, benchmarking, peer review, overlapping membership, mimicry, learning and technical systems.154 The legal literature
reveals a range of others.155 The main task for theory building, then, is to determine which mechanisms are most important in transnational business governance.
Braithwaite and Drahos have laid important groundwork for this exercise.
Based on exhaustive study in 13 ﬁelds spanning several centuries, they identify
six mechanisms through which business regulation has globalised: coercion,
reward, modeling, reciprocal adjustment, non-reciprocal coordination and
capacity-building.156 Modeling is the most consistently important, followed by
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reciprocal adjustment.157 There is no master mechanism, however; the globalisation of regulation always involves multiple mechanisms.158
A question for theory is to clarify the relationships among modeling, mimicry
and isomorphism. Many scholars equate modeling and mimicry, but Braithwaite
and Drahos distinguish them. For them, modeling entails observational learning,
in which actors display, symbolically interpret and emulate regulatory models;
imitation merely involves one actor matching another’s actions, evidently
without reﬂection.159 Imitation, then, is restricted to unconscious isomorphism,
where isomorphic pressures emerge from systems, cultures or mentalities.160
Braithwaite and Drahos offer a detailed theory of modeling in which model
missionaries promote a particular model because they believe in it; model mercenaries exploit the markets model missionaries open up; model mongers, lacking the
resources to develop their own models, experimentally ﬂoat numerous models in
hopes of ﬁnding one that catches on; model misers adopt pre-packaged models
(often ﬂoated by model mongers) to economise on the costs of model development; and model modernisers in the periphery adopt models from the centre to
harness the legitimating power of a modern, progressive identity.161
Modeling is important because of bounded rationality: decision-makers are
unable to address fully the limitless range of issues they face, so it often makes
sense to adopt pre-packaged solutions that are good enough, rather than search
for optimal solutions.162 Decision-makers frequently “dither in a confusion of
complexity they cannot grasp, which is why they can be led by entrepreneurs
who encourage them onto a plausibly interest-enhancing path”.163
Modeling is also important because it is one of the few mechanisms available
to the weak. Structurally weak model mongers can devote their scarce resources to
ﬂoating regulatory models until they land on one that catches a powerful adversary
off balance; then they can pour all their resources “into a feat of political ju-jitsu
that ﬂips the off-balance adversary”.164 Yet Braithwaite and Drahos’s conclusions
about model mongering are not entirely persuasive. Most of their case studies
suggest that the key actors are either model missionaries, who promote preferred
models out of belief, or model mercenaries, who proﬁt by promoting a particular
model, rather than experimentalist model mongers.
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Other signiﬁcant mechanisms in TBGI include conditional rule referencing,165
overlapping memberships and contracting.166 Benjamin Cashore, Michael Stone
and Lars Gulbrandsen show that rule referencing in forest certiﬁcation creates
interdependencies that enhance the capacities of state and non-state regulators:
non-state schemes beneﬁt from states’ enforcement capacity, states gain nonstate schemes’ norm-generating capacity and each gains symbolic resources
from the other.167 Theories of transnational governance interaction should also
acknowledge the multiplicity and interlinking of mechanisms, in line with
Braithwaite and Drahos’s observations.168 More empirical and theoretical work
on mechanisms is also needed. Even Braithwaite and Drahos’s analysis of mechanisms is generic and synthetic. It is often unclear which mechanisms are
employed, by which actors for what purposes, or how they operate.
Finally, scholars should investigate the structural factors that affect mechanisms and pathways. Santos identiﬁes six structural places in society, each with
its own interactive logic. The coexistence and overlap of structural places mean
that interactions “are often informed by different and mutually incongruent
logics”.169 Alternatively, pathways of interaction may coincide with or exploit
the pathways of economic production and consumption.170 Markets, hierarchies,
networks and communities may have different logics that affect the availability
or operation of mechanisms. For example, coercion may be more common and
effective in a hierarchy than in a network.171 Braithwaite and Drahos observe
that webs of dialogue are more common and more often effective than webs of
reward and coercion,172 and that strategic wisdom lies in knowing “which
strand(s) to seek to tighten at which moment in order to tauten a web that ﬂoats
in time and space”.173 Networks themselves may be conceived as pathways of
interaction or structures conditioning interaction. Variation in network characteristics may also inﬂuence the character of interaction between regulatory networks
and conventional regimes.174
In this special issue, Biggins and Scott identify ﬁve mechanisms of interaction
in the case of derivatives: ISDA standard-setting; its lobbying and other activities
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designed to shape the regulatory regime for derivatives; its intervention in important court cases; its provision of advice on systemically important events; and its
central role in reforming credit default swap settlement mechanisms after the
global ﬁnancial crisis. These are not mechanisms in our sense, however; they
are case-speciﬁc strategies. Yet it may be possible to abstract more general mechanisms from these examples. For example, ISDA’s standard-setting and lobbying,
and states’ passage of ISDA’s model laws, may be instances of modeling, norm
entrepreneurship and rule incorporation.
This point highlights the need to clarify what constitutes a mechanism or
pathway, and how they are distinct from strategies, modes, drivers and shapers
of interaction. For analytical purposes, mechanisms must be abstracted from
speciﬁc actions, but concrete enough to be recognisable. Braithwaite and
Drahos, for example, focus not on higher-order, abstract mechanisms like
reinforcement, but on lower-order, concrete mechanisms like reward and coercion.
Buhmann’s article poses similar issues. She describes networks, discursive
strategies and even TBG schemes as mechanisms of interaction. Yet her examples
suggest the mechanisms of modeling, mimicry, rule incorporation, learning and
other cognitive interaction mechanisms.175 Buhman also suggests that mechanisms at the evaluation and review stage include cross-scheme comparison of
experiences, investigation of complaints, and governmental reporting. These
resemble generalisable mechanisms of peer review, benchmarking, learning and
experimentalism.
Doorey proposes a typology of four actor-level and three scheme-level mechanisms and pathways. In the ﬁrst four, the pathways are actors who participate in
multiple TBG schemes. These mechanisms include dialogue and norm entrepreneurship, with actors “like honey bees pollinating TBG schemes with ideas and
norms”;176 information distribution and knowledge sharing across schemes;
supply chain coordination, with suppliers selecting or avoiding more stringent
codes; and policy learning and diffusion, through education, research, and
social networks. The relationship between dialogue and norm entrepreneurship,
on one hand, and policy learning and diffusion, on the other, is not entirely clear:
both involve actors spreading the “pollen” of norms and knowledge. The ﬁrst
scheme-level mechanism is mimicry or mimetic isomorphism, in which a
TBG scheme adopts successful designs or norms; Doorey seems to treat
this as synonymous with modeling, raising the deﬁnitional issue discussed
above. The ﬁnal two mechanisms are conditional rule referencing and metaregulation.
Webb’s description of ISO 26000 as a bridge suggests a master metaphor
for several mechanisms of interaction. Webb identiﬁes several bridging functions: top-down transposition of concepts from intergovernmental to non-state
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instruments; bottom-up transposition of concepts from narrow non-state standards to broader social responsibility activities; uniting public, private and
civil society sectors in standards development and implementation; and the
emergence of a global custom. However, the main mechanisms at work in
the case are modeling, institutional isomorphism and conditional rule
referencing.
Webb’s study indicates that these mechanisms may work top-down or bottomup, and may amplify the source standard, not just duplicate it. Thus ISO 26000
extended the due diligence and Plan-Do-Check-Act approaches to all social
responsibility activities, from human rights and management systems respectively.
The case also highlights meta-regulation and contracting as coordination mechanisms. Contracting through Memoranda of Agreement between ISO and other
instrument developers facilitated top-town transposition and normative convergence. Finally, the rich normative conversation achieved in the ISO 26000 drafting
process appears to embody Doorey’s mechanism of dialogue.
3.7 The development of interactions over time and space
“It is easier to call for a dynamic theory than to produce one”, Abbott and Snidal
remind us.177 Yet theories of TBGI must seek to capture spatio-temporal
dynamics.178 Over time, institutional structures and processes converge and
diverge; some norms and practices spread, others do not; standards are ratcheted
up or down; states enter and retreat from governance ﬁelds; non-state regulatory
authority waxes and wanes; conﬂicts transform into cooperation or vice versa;
some TBG schemes wither away and others dominate. Change over time is a
key dimension of our TBGI analytical framework, but the spatial dimension
also merits more attention. Transnational business governance has an uneven
geography that implicates disparities between legal centres and peripheries.179
Theoretical approaches that integrate spatial and temporal dynamics into their
conceptual apparatus should be especially fruitful—examples include the recursive dynamics in theories of experimentalism, transnational legal orders and
open systems. Shaffer and Halliday theorise transnational legal ordering as a
dynamic, recursive process of interaction among transnational and national law,
characterised by mutual inﬂuences, temporary and contingent settlements, and
periodic destabilisations triggering further recursive cycles.180 Experimentalist
governance involves recursive interactions between central and local regulating
units.181 Doorey’s open systems theory integrates change within its processual
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model of inputs, outputs and feedback loops. Calliess and Zumbansen’s RCRC
model emphasises ongoing processes of normative experimentation and
recombination.182
When addressing spatio-temporal dynamics, theories should seek to explain
instances of governance failure, not just of success.183 Meinhard Doelle and
others, for example, apply David and Louise Trubek’s concepts of complementarity, rivalry and transformation184 to the failure of the Forest Carbon Standards
Committee.185 It would be instructive to examine whether interactions with
other governance actors and schemes contributed to this failure.
All the articles in this special issue describe fascinating changes over time,
including changes in the scale, character, mechanisms and effects of interaction
over time and across institutional settings and components of regulatory governance. Doorey highlights another important aspect: tension between change at
the level of norms and persistence at the level of on-the-ground practices, which
may give rise to further rounds of interaction and the transformation of governance
schemes. All these articles invite further theoretical elaboration of temporal and
spatial dynamics.

4. Conclusion
Interactions among legal actors, institutions, norms and orders are central features
of transnational law, yet transnational legal theory casts only ﬂeeting or narrow
glances at them. The time is ripe to make the interactive dynamics of transnational
law the subject of sustained empirical and theoretical attention. Efforts to govern
global business provide a useful context in which to do so. A rich body of interdisciplinary empirical research on this subject is emerging, but more theory building is needed to advance scholarly understanding of the dynamics and effects of
transnational business governance interactions.
The relative lack of attention to theory in the special issue articles (with the
notable exception of Doorey) is understandable at this stage in the TBGI research
program, when the focus remains on rich empirical description. The articles
demonstrate that our TBGI analytical framework provides a useful common
language for conducting and comparing such research. But the framework’s
181
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relative agnosticism as to theoretical and methodological approaches should not be
mistaken as invitation to ignore theory. Quite the opposite: we hope to spur
researchers to develop, test and reﬁne theories.
The most fruitful theoretical approaches, we believe, will recognise the heterogeneity of interacting entities; emphasise meso-level interactions among regulatory authorities and schemes; explore the links between interactions at different
scales, between agency and structure, among components of the regulatory
process, between drivers and effects and among modes of interaction. They will
also examine the impacts of interactions on the capacity and performance of regulatory systems, specify concrete interaction mechanisms and strive to capture
spatio-temporal dynamics.
No single theory can accomplish all this. A variety of theoretical perspectives
will be needed to illuminate this complex phenomenon. Theory building, then, can
focus on middle-range generalisations about speciﬁc features of TBGI, with the
aim of building up “a ‘toolbox’ of explanations that can be widely applied, gradually increasing the ﬁeld’s stock of understanding”.186 There are many possible
candidates, including problem structures; interaction mechanisms such as modeling, conditional rule referencing and supply chain coordination; interlinkages
among mechanisms; regulatory ratchets; indicators and determinants of regulatory
capacity; meso-level processes like meta-regulation and orchestration; cross-scalar
strategies like forum-shifting and norm entrepreneurship; and structural logics of
action. Theoretical “modules” like these are the building blocks of middle-range
theory.187 Thick descriptive research and inductivist middle-range theory building
will allow us to understand better the impacts of governance interactions on regulatory outputs, outcomes and capacities and, ultimately, on what really matters—
the social and economic performance of transnational business and the lives of
ordinary people.
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